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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD REQUIRED TO PREVAIL
IN A SYSTEMIC CHALLENGE TO AN INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEM

STEPHEN F. HANLON*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the appropriate legal
standard for systemic challenges to state or local indigent defense systems.
One federal circuit court of appeals has ruled. 1 Since 2010, at least four state
supreme courts, one state appellate court, and one federal district court have
considered this question. 2 The United States Department of Justice filed a
Statement of Interest in the federal district court case and has filed an amicus
brief in two systemic challenges to state indigent defense systems. 3 There are
several pending systemic challenges to state indigent defense systems around

* General Counsel, National Association for Public Defense, www.publicdefenders.us, a national
organization of more than 15,000 public defenders and other public defense officials. Mr. Hanlon
also serves as the American Bar Association’s Project Director for the public defender workload
studies described herein. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Practice at Saint Louis University
School of Law. The author wishes to express his gratitude for the review and editing of this
article by Norman Lefstein, Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus of the Indiana University
Robert H. McKinney School of Law; Margaret Winter, former Associate Director of the ACLU
National Prison Project; Roger L. Goldman, Callis Family Professor of Law Emeritus, Saint
Louis University School of Law; Malia Brink, Assistant Counsel for Public Defense, Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, American Bar Association; and Maureen
Hanlon (no known relation to the author), a law student at Saint Louis University School of Law.
The views expressed herein are those of the author himself, and all errors of judgment or
otherwise are his and his alone. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation for its support of his work in Louisiana referred to below, which was the
catalyst for this article. Again, the views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the
Foundation.
1. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, Luckey
v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 674 (11th Cir. 1992).
2. Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123–24 (W.D. Wash. 2013);
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219–20 (N.Y. 2010); State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592,
597–98 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); Pub. Def., 11th Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261,
265 (Fla. 2013); Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 717–18 (Pa. 2016); Duncan v. State, 774
N.W.2d 89, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
3. See Court Filings in Support of Access to Justice, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, www.justice.
gov/atj/court-filings-support-access-justice [http://perma.cc/6UK4-UEZ6].
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the country and more are contemplated. 4 This article will examine the various
ways in which the courts have addressed this question, particularly since 2010.
Section I of this article is a review of the major cases since 2010 that
involve systemic challenges to indigent defense systems, either by classes of
indigent defendants or by their attorneys, or both, seeking prospective
injunctive relief pre-trial. 5 Section II analyzes and critiques those cases.
Section III addresses class certification concerns after the Supreme Court’s
2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. 6 Section IV articulates the argument for a
risk-based claim that asserts systemic Sixth Amendment violations. Section V
addresses the “dismiss and release” portion of the remedy urged here. And
finally, Section VI concludes with a recommendation for future Sixth
Amendment systemic challenges to state and local indigent defense systems.
I. THE MAJOR CASES
A.

Cronic and Strickland

Strickland and Cronic were decided on the same day—May 14, 1984.
Neither Strickland nor Cronic involved pre-trial claims for prospective
injunctive relief for systemic violations of the Sixth Amendment. Rather, both
cases involved post-conviction attempts by individual defendants seeking to
overturn their convictions based on claims of actual ineffective assistance of
counsel.
1.

United States v. Cronic

A young lawyer with a real estate practice was appointed to represent a
defendant charged with mail fraud in a check kiting scheme that involved over
$9,400,000 in checks moving between banks in Tampa, Florida and Norman,
Oklahoma during a four-month period in 1975. 7 The court gave the young
lawyer only twenty-five days to prepare for trial, even though it had taken the

4. See, e.g., Phillips v. California, No. 15-CE-CG-02201 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 14, 2015);
Tucker v. Idaho, No. CV-OC-2015-10240 (Idaho Dist. Ct.), appeal docketed, No. 43922-2016
(Idaho Jan. 25, 2016); Joseph Allen v. John Bel Edwards, No. C655079 (La. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6,
2017); Church v. Missouri, No. 17AC-CC00130 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2017).
5. Pre-trial claims are ones asserted prospectively by the class plaintiffs (indigent criminal
defendants) before trial has commenced in their criminal cases. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017. This is
opposed to the kind of claim asserted by an individual plaintiff in a case like Strickland v.
Washington, which was a claim asserted by an individual defendant post-trial, in a retrospective
attempt to overturn a guilty verdict. 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
6. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
7. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649 (1983); United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d
1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982). A specific listing of the attorney’s experience in criminal law is not
in the record, but this defense was “at best his second venture into that field.” Cronic, 675 F.2d at
1128.
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government over four and one-half years to investigate the case. 8 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on Sixth Amendment
grounds, 9 but made no determination of whether counsel’s actual performance
had prejudiced the defense. 10 Instead, the Tenth Circuit found that no such
showing is necessary “when circumstances hamper a given lawyer’s
preparation of a defendant’s case.” 11
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit because there had been no
finding that there had been an actual breakdown of the adversarial process
during the trial. 12 In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]here are
. . . circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” 13 Justice Stevens,
writing for a unanimous court, also famously observed, “The right to the
effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the
prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” 14
The Court identified two kinds of cases when no specific finding of
prejudice is required. 15 First and most obvious is the complete denial of
counsel. 16 Second, “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing, then . . . the adversary process itself [is]
presumptively unreliable” and no specific showing of prejudice is required. 17
This kind of denial of counsel has come to be known as constructive denial of
counsel. 18 Because Cronic’s case was not one where the circumstances led to
this presumption, he would need to point out specific errors by trial counsel to
succeed on his claim, and the Supreme Court remanded to the Tenth Circuit to
examine that issue accordingly. 19

8. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1129.
9. Id. at 1130.
10. Id. at 1128.
11. Id.
12. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662.
13. Id. at 658.
14. Id. at 656.
15. Id. at 659.
16. Id.
17. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.
18. Constructive is used to define a reality, “declared such by judicial construction or
interpretation.” Constructive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
constructive [http://perma.cc/8NYF-AUJP]. However, Strickland seems to reserve that term for
claims that involve state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
19. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666–67. After remand, the Tenth Circuit found the defendant was
denied effective assistance of counsel and a new trial was ordered. United States v. Cronic, 839
F.2d 1401, 1404 (10th Cir. 1988). After a new trial and appeal, Cronic’s sentence was vacated
after finding the evidence against him was legally insufficient to prove mail fraud. United States
v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1990).
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Strickland v. Washington

Charles Strickland pled guilty to three capital murder charges. 20
Strickland’s lawyer decided not to look for or put on evidence of Strickland’s
character or mental state. 21 Instead his lawyer relied on Strickland’s admission
of guilt and the trial judge’s remarks at the plea colloquy. 22 The lawyer
reasoned that this strategy would prevent the state from introducing psychiatric
evidence of its own. 23
The trial judge sentenced Strickland to death. 24 Strickland sought collateral
review in the state courts on the grounds that his lawyer was ineffective. 25 The
trial court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
relief. 26 Strickland then filed a habeas petition in federal district court. 27
After the federal district court denied habeas relief on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
sentence, sustaining the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, using a
“reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances” test,
and outlining standards for determining whether defense counsel fulfilled the
duty to investigate and whether counsel’s errors were prejudicial. 28 This case
gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to consider the appropriate standards
for adjudicating post-trial claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel. 29 Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, succinctly stated the question presented:
The petition presents a type of Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not
previously considered in any generality. The Court has considered Sixth
Amendment claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether, as well as claims based on state interference with the ability
of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused. . . . [T]he Court has
never directly and fully addressed a claim of “actual ineffectiveness” of
30
counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial.

As would be apparent later in the opinion, that last phrase should probably
have read, “in a case that has already gone to trial.”

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1247–48.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1248 n.4.
Id. at 1247.
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1247–48.
Id.
Id. at 1248–49.
Id. at 1250–63.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
Id. at 683 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 648 (1983)).
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So, the Supreme Court recognized three distinct kinds of claims for
individual post-trial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel seeking to
overturn convictions 31:
• Claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether; 32
• Claims based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render
effective assistance to the accused; 33
• Claims based on “actual ineffectiveness” of counsel. 34
Turning to the third kind of claim it had identified, “actual
ineffectiveness,” the Court acknowledged that it had already recognized that
“the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” 35 The
Court then held that “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms[,]” citing the
“[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in . . . [the] ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice . . . (‘The Defense Function’).” 36 The Court specifically cited
the ABA Standards as guides for courts to determine what is reasonable
behavior by counsel, and disclaimed any other set of detailed rules as
appropriate for this task. 37 The Court ultimately endorsed the “reasonably
effective assistance” performance standard that had been previously adopted
by all federal courts of appeals. 38
Turning to the question of prejudice, the Court noted that in certain Sixth
Amendment contexts, namely, “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance
of counsel altogether[,]” prejudice is presumed. 39 The Court reiterated Cronic
in holding prejudice should also be presumed in various kinds of state
interference with counsel’s assistance when prejudice is so likely that “case31. Each of these claims is jurisdictionally distinct. Each has separate elements; each has
separate proof; each has separate remedies. Each must be separately and critically analyzed.
Finally, each has radically different practical consequences in terms of structuring systemic
litigation designed to provide actual systemic reform on the ground. I analyze them here because
when and if the Supreme Court decides to articulate the appropriate standard for a Sixth
Amendment challenge to a large indigent defense system, it will likely look to Strickland and its
progeny for guidance.
32. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
33. Id. This article will not address potential litigation based on this claim except to note
there may be great potential in any state that has systematically underfunded its indigent defense
system. Future examination could conceptualize a constructive interference claim; i.e., state
interference by persistent failure to fund, impairing the court’s ability to function, declared as
such by judicial construction or interpretation.
34. Id. at 693.
35. Id. at 686 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
36. Id. at 688 (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980)).
37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89.
38. Id. at 683.
39. Id. at 692.
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by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.” 40 The Court then held that
a showing of prejudice is required in claims like the one in Strickland where an
individual makes a post-conviction claim that his conviction should be
overturned because of his lawyer’s actual ineffectiveness. 41
B.

Lower Court Cases Following Strickland and Cronic
1.

Luckey v. Harris

As noted above, no Supreme Court case has ever addressed the standard to
prevail in a class action brought pre-trial by a class of indigent accused persons
and attorneys representing them, seeking prospective Sixth Amendment
injunctive relief for actual ineffectiveness. The only federal court of appeals
case that has done so is Luckey v. Harris. 42 This case was appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit from an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). 43
Luckey was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action brought against state officials
on behalf of a bilateral class consisting of all indigent persons then charged or
who would in the future be charged with criminal offenses in Georgia and all
attorneys who then represented or who would in the future represent indigent
defendants. 44 The Luckey plaintiffs sought “an across-the-board ruling that the
Georgia criminal defense scheme systematically denies or will deny in the
future effective assistance of counsel to the indigent accused.” 45
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the actual ineffectiveness standard from
Strickland, holding the two-pronged performance and prejudice standard was
“inappropriate” for a civil suit seeking prospective relief. 46 Discussing the
needs of a civil suit, the court went on to hold:
The sixth amendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial.
Thus, deficiencies that do not meet the ‘ineffectiveness’ standard may
nonetheless violate a defendant’s rights under the sixth amendment. In the
post-trial context, such errors may be deemed harmless because they did not
affect the outcome of the trial. Whether an accused has been prejudiced by the
denial of a right is an issue that relates to relief—whether the defendant is

40. Id. The Court specifically cites to examples in Cronic of state interference in individual
post-conviction cases seeking to overturn convictions. Id. (citing United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 658 (1983)).
41. Id. at 693.
42. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, Luckey v.
Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992).
43. Id. at 1013.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1016 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 1017.
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entitled to have his or her conviction overturned—rather than to the question of
47
whether such a right exists and can be protected prospectively.

The court held the “powerful considerations” justifying the Strickland
prejudice prong in a post-conviction actual ineffectiveness case do not apply in
prospective relief cases. 48 Deferential scrutiny of counsel’s performance is
appropriate in such a case based on concerns for finality, concern that
extensive post-trial burdens would discourage counsel from accepting cases,
and concern for the independence of counsel. 49
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the relief sought in a case seeking
injunctive relief from those previously brought in post-trial claims seeking to
overturn a conviction:
Prospective relief is designed to avoid future harm. Therefore, it can protect
constitutional rights, even if the violation of these rights would not affect the
outcome of the trial. . . .
In a suit for prospective relief the plaintiff’s burden is to show “the likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of
remedies at law.” . . . This is the standard to which appellants, as a class,
50
should have been held.

The Eleventh Circuit then described the kinds of claims that the class had
alleged in their complaint, including systemic delays in the appointment of
counsel that denied them their Sixth Amendment right to counsel at critical
stages in the criminal process, pressure by the courts to hurry their case to trial
or enter a guilty plea, and denial of investigative and expert resources
“necessary to defend them effectively.” 51 The court thus reversed the motion to
dismiss and concluded that these allegations were sufficient to state a viable
claim of a denial of Sixth Amendment rights. 52
The Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of O’Shea v. Littleton’s “likelihood of
substantial and immediate irreparable injury” test is what I call a risk-based
test throughout the rest of this article. 53 This is to distinguish this test from the
performance-based test that Luckey and, as we shall see, Hurrell-Harring
rejected.

47. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1017–18 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974) (emphasis
added)).
51. Id. at 1018 (emphasis added).
52. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1018.
53. Id. at 1017–18.
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Hurrell-Harring v. State

Like Luckey, Hurrell-Harring v. State dealt with a putative class action by
individual criminal defendants seeking prospective injunctive relief for
systemic Sixth Amendment violations in five counties in upstate New York. 54
The case came before the New York Court of Appeals after the state appealed
the denial of its motion to dismiss. 55 Plaintiffs in this case were indigent
defendants with ongoing criminal prosecutions represented by defense systems
in five counties in upstate New York. 56
The plaintiffs’ claim, as interpreted by the intermediate appellate court
ruling under review, was that the state’s public defense system was
“systematically deficient and presents a grave and unacceptable risk that
indigent criminal defendants are being or will be denied their constitutional
right to meaningful and effective assistance of counsel.” 57 So stated, the claim
appeared to adopt Luckey’s admonition that in a suit for prospective injunctive
relief, the plaintiffs’ burden is to show the likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury. 58
But the New York Court of Appeals ignored Luckey and ignored the riskbased nature of the plaintiffs’ claim. Rather, it accepted the defendants’
argument that the plaintiffs’ claim was simply a performance-based twopronged Strickland claim asserting both failure of performance and
prejudice. 59 Such a claim, the court believed, was “necessarily rooted in the
particular circumstances of an individual case [and] cannot serve as a predicate
for systemic relief.” 60 Having so characterized the plaintiffs’ claim, the court
majority wasted little time deciding that there were inherent problems in such a
systemic challenge. 61
Then, as the dissent accurately noted, the court read a constructive denial
of counsel claim into the complaint, focusing on some of the factual allegations
about individual plaintiffs in the complaint who either had no counsel at all
(what the court majority called “nonrepresentation”) or had counsel who,
although nominally appointed, were unavailable to their clients (what I call
“nominal” representation). 62

54. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219 (N.Y. 2010).
55. Id.
56. Id. The counties at issue were Washington, Onondaga, Ontario, Schuyler, and Suffolk
counties. Id.
57. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
58. See Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017–18.
59. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 221.
60. Id. at 220.
61. Id. at 221.
62. Id. at 222. The dissent takes issue with the majority’s insertion of a constructive denial
claim, arguing, “Plaintiffs’ mere lumping together of 20 generic ineffective assistance of counsel

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD REQUIRED TO PREVAIL

633

The Hurrell-Harring court was quite clear about what issues were before
the court, finding that “[t]he questions properly raised in this Sixth
Amendment-grounded action, we think, go not to whether ineffectiveness has
assumed systemic dimensions, but rather to whether the State has met its
foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal representation.” 63 The
majority then found that the claims in this case were in the latter category. 64
The court could not have been clearer on this point: “[T]he complaint states a
claim for constructive denial of the right to counsel by reason of insufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon.” 65 And again: “These
allegations state a claim, not for ineffective assistance under Strickland, but for
basic denial of the right to counsel under Gideon.” 66
3.

Duncan v. State

In Duncan v. State, a putative class of indigent criminal defendants subject
to felony convictions in three Michigan counties brought this case in state
court under 42 U.S.C § 1983, asserting that the indigent defense systems in
those counties were constitutionally deficient due to inadequate funding and
lack of fiscal and administrative oversight. 67 The trial court granted class
certification and denied the state’s motion for summary disposition of the
claim, and the state appealed. 68 The Michigan appeals court held that based on
the pleadings before it the plaintiffs stated viable claims for relief and upheld
the trial court’s class certification ruling. 69
Further, the court held that in this class action challenge to the
constitutionality of these three indigent defense systems the plaintiffs’ burden
was two-fold. 70 First, plaintiffs must show that “counsel’s representation falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to a critical stage in
the proceedings.” 71 Second, plaintiffs must show that instances of deficient
performance and denial of counsel are widespread and systemic and that they

claims into one civil pleading does not ipso facto transform it into one alleging a systemic denial
of the right to counsel.” Id. at 230 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 221–22 (emphasis added).
64. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224.
65. Id. at 225.
66. Id. at 224.
67. 774 N.W.2d 89, 97, 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
68. Id. at 97.
69. Id. at 145.
70. Id. at 123–24.
71. Id. at 123. The court further noted, “[S]imply being deprived of the constitutional right to
effective representation at a critical stage in the proceedings, in and of itself, gives rise to harm.”
Id. at 127.
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are caused by weaknesses and problems in the three indigent defense systems
involved in the case. 72
The court left it to the trial court to determine “the parameters of what
constitutes ‘widespread,’ ‘systemic,’ or ‘pervasive’ constitutional violations or
harm.” 73 The court further held the trial court on remand would need to
consider the degree of harm shown, “giving more weight to instances of
deficient performance that resulted in unreliable verdicts and instances where
the right to counsel was denied, with less weight being given where there is
mere deficient performance.” 74 The court further noted that the plaintiffs “will
no doubt have a heavy burden to prove and establish their case” at trial. 75
The court relied on Luckey for the proposition that the two-pronged
Strickland standard is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief
but did not formulate its test as a risk-based test. 76 The court upheld the trial
court’s ruling on class certification, noting that “[b]ecause there is limited case
law in Michigan addressing class certifications, this Court may refer to federal
cases construing the federal rules on class certification.” 77
4.

Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State

In this Florida case, a public defender filed a motion to be relieved of
appointments to represent indigent defendants in noncapital felony cases,
claiming excessive caseloads caused by underfunding created a widespread
problem as to effective representation. 78 The trial court granted relief, but the
intermediate appellate court reversed. 79 The Florida Supreme Court sided with
the trial court and held that given the massive evidentiary showing made by the
public defender, relief from excessive caseloads was appropriate, and
remanded the case to the trial court to determine if current circumstances
warranted relief (after five years of litigation). 80 No relief was subsequently
sought. 81
The court used a risk-based standard contained in the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar to decide the case. 82 A Florida statute provided that when a public
defender’s basis for withdrawal is a conflict of interest (due to excessive
caseloads or otherwise), the court could only permit withdrawal if it found that

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128–29.
Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 138.
Pub. Def., 11th Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 283.
The author confirmed this fact with Miami Public Defender Carlos Martinez.
Pub. Def., 115 So. 3d at 279 (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2)).
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the conflict was prejudicial. 83 The court held that under the statute, the
prejudice required for withdrawal in a case involving excessive caseloads was
a showing of a “substantial risk that [the] representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,”
citing the Florida Rule identical to ABA Model Rule 1.7(a)(2). 84 The Florida
standard is very similar to the risk-based standard for systemic Sixth
Amendment violations that I argue for in this article. 85
The Florida Supreme Court drew on Luckey and carefully distinguished the
performance-based claim that Luckey rejected and the risk-based claim for
systemic Sixth Amendment violations that Luckey presaged. 86 The court also
opined that the case before it had “very similar circumstances” to those
presented in the Hurrell-Harring case 87 and concluded that “the circumstances
presented here involve some measure of non-representation and therefore a
denial of the actual assistance of counsel guaranteed by Gideon and the Sixth
Amendment.” 88
5.

Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon

This was a class action originally brought in a state court and removed to
federal court by the defendants. 89 The plaintiffs were indigent criminal
defendants who sought prospective injunctive relief against two small
municipalities in Washington state, asserting a constructive denial claim
similar to the claim identified by the Hurrell-Harring court. 90 The plaintiffs
argued that Gideon, not Strickland, provided the proper standard for the case. 91
The case required the trial judge to analyze the workloads and performance
of four lawyers in two small municipalities in the State of Washington. 92 The
court found that that “the public defense system [had] systemic flaws;” that the
defenders “represent[ed] the client in name only in these circumstances;” and
that “[s]uch perfunctory ‘representation’ does not satisfy the Sixth
Amendment,” citing Hurrell-Harring’s finding that such failures to
communicate or appear at critical stages, may be reasonably interpreted as

83. Id. at 275.
84. Id. (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2)). This is the same risk-based Rules of
Professional Responsibility claim that I set out in Section IV.
85. See infra Section IV.
86. Pub. Def., 115 So. 3d at 276–77.
87. Id. at 277.
88. Id. at 278.
89. Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
90. Id. at 1124.
91. Id. at 1127.
92. Id. at 1124–28.
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nonrepresentation rather than ineffective representation. 93 The court found that
the plaintiffs had proven a systemic deprivation of the right to the assistance of
counsel. 94 The court granted injunctive relief that, among other things, ordered
the defendants to hire a part-time “Public Defense Supervisor” to work at least
twenty hours per week to supervise and evaluate the performance of these four
lawyers, to collect and analyze data regarding their performance, and to submit
bi-annual reports to the parties and the court. 95 The Luckey decision is not cited
in this case.
6.

State v. Waters 96

The Missouri Public Defender promulgated a rule providing for
certification of unavailability once a district defender’s office exceeded the
established caseload maximums. Those maximums had been established by a
rule it had promulgated and a protocol it had developed and incorporated in the
rule. 97 A district defender office with caseloads that exceeded those maximums
moved in a criminal court to be relieved of further representation of clients,
asserting claims under the rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the
Sixth Amendment. 98 The trial judge did not question that the district
defender’s office had an excessive caseload, but the court nonetheless ordered
the district defender office to continue its representation of new eligible
indigent defendants. 99 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court, as requested by
the Missouri Public Defender, ordered the trial court to vacate that order,
finding that the trial court had exceeded its authority by appointing the public
defender to represent a defendant in contravention of the Rules of Professional

93. Id. at 1131–32. The facts in this case (e.g., the trial court’s observation that
“representation . . . remains inadequate” and the trial court’s concern about lack of
“representational relationship”) actually appear to constitute what I call “nominal representation.”
Id. at 1128.
94. Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
95. Id. at 1134–37.
96. The author was lead counsel for the Missouri Public Defender in Waters.
97. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). Public defender offices in
Missouri operate under the control of the public defender commission, which is vested with
corresponding powers necessary and convenient to providing representation to indigent
defendants. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.015–600.101 (2016). The commission is thus authorized to
“[m]ake any rules needed for the administration of the state public defender system.” MO. REV.
STAT. § 600.017(10) (2016). The rule at issue provides that once a district office exceeds the
maximum caseload standard for three consecutive calendar months, “‘the director may limit the
office’s availability to accept additional cases by filing a certification of limited availability’ with
the appropriate court.” Waters, 370 S.W.3d. at 599.
98. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 597.
99. Id. at 601.
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Conduct, the Sixth Amendment, and the Missouri Public Defender’s caseload
maximum rule. 100
In analyzing the public defender’s Strickland claim, the court noted the
Supreme Court’s admonition in Kimmelman v. Morrison that “the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.” 101 “Moreover,” the
Waters court noted, “this right is affirmative and prospective.” 102
The court saw the central issues as (1) the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceeding, and (2) the ethical
obligation of counsel not to accept work if counsel does not believe he or she
can perform competently. 103 Relying on Missouri v. Frye, 104 the court held:
The constitutional right to effective counsel applies to all critical stages of the
proceeding; it is a prospective right to have counsel’s advice during the
proceeding and is not merely a retrospective right to have a verdict or plea set
aside if one can prove that the absence of competent counsel affected the
proceeding.
Simply put, a judge may not appoint counsel when the judge is aware that, for
whatever reason, counsel is unable to provide effective representation to a
defendant. Effective, not just pro forma, representation is required by the
105
Missouri and federal constitutions.

Turning to the Rules of Professional Conduct claim, the court applied the
Rule 1.7 test to determine whether excessive caseloads produce a “significant
risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.” 106 Relying on a similar case
from California, 107 the court found that “a conflict of interest is inevitably
created when a public defender is compelled by his or her excessive caseload
to choose between the rights of the various indigent defendants he or she is
representing.” 108
Turning finally to the Missouri Public Defender Commission’s maximum
caseload rule, the court held the rule valid and specifically noted that it was
with the above constitutional and ethical rights and obligations in mind that the

100. Id. at 607.
101. Id. at 606 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986)) (emphasis in
original).
102. Id.
103. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 607.
104. 566 U.S. 133 (2012).
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Id. (citing Rule 4-1.7(a)(2)).
107. In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725, 746–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
108. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 608. Interestingly, the court found that “while the ethical rules do
not supplant ‘a trial judge’s obligation to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights,’ they do
‘run parallel to’ that duty.” Id.
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Commission enacted the maximum caseload rule. 109 The court found that no
infirmity with the rule had been established under state law, and thus the trial
judge exceeded his authority by appointing the public defender in violation of
that rule. 110
No claim of constructive denial of counsel was asserted in this case. 111 In
the briefs and at oral argument, the Missouri Public Defender urged the court
to apply the risk-based Luckey test of likelihood of substantial and immediate
irreparable injury, but the court did not cite to or rely on Luckey in its
opinion. 112
Waters stands for the proposition that when a statewide public defender
office can demonstrate that it has so many cases that its lawyers cannot provide
competent and effective representation to all of their clients, lawyers may
refuse additional appointments and judges may not appoint them to represent
additional indigent defendants. 113 When that occurs, judges should prioritize
cases on their dockets in the interest of public safety, so that the most serious
cases are assigned to public defenders, and if no competent public defender can
be found to represent those charged with less serious crimes, those cases
should be dismissed. 114 Moreover, if the defendants in such cases are in
custody, they should be released. 115
7.

Kuren v. Luzerne County

This was a class action case filed in a state court by the Luzerne County
Public Defender and his clients under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting
constitutional claims based on the inability to provide competent legal
representation due to inadequate funding. 116 The trial court found that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action for mandamus or a constitutional
violation. 117 An intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 118
The case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 119
The United States Department of Justice filed an amicus brief asserting
that a claim for constructive denial of counsel is cognizable under the Sixth

109. Id. at 612.
110. Id.
111. See generally State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
112. Brief for Petitioner at 40–41, 47, State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)
(No. SC91150), 2011 WL 5118554, at *40–41, *47.
113. Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 607.
114. Id. at 611.
115. Id. at 611–12.
116. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 718, 720 (Pa. 2016).
117. Id. at 726.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 729.
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Amendment. 120 Prospective injunctive relief for such a claim is viable, and the
DOJ argued:
(1) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers of representation—
such as timely and confidential consultation with clients, appropriate
investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case—
are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when substantial structural
limitations—such as a severe lack of resources, unreasonably high workloads,
or critical staffing of public defender offices—cause that absence or limitation
121
on representation.

The DOJ argued that “when the totality of the circumstances indicate[s] . . . a
system-wide problem of nonrepresentation,” i.e., the appointment of counsel is
merely cosmetic and the defendant has a lawyer in name only, prospective
relief must be available. 122
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied upon and extensively analyzed
Luckey, Duncan, and Hurrell-Harring, finding all three cases to be
“persuasive, indeed, compelling.” 123 The court held that “there is a cognizable
cause of action whereby a class of indigent defendants may seek relief for a
widespread, systematic and constructive denial of counsel when alleged
deficiencies in funding and resources provided by the county deny indigent
defendants their constitutional right to counsel.” 124
Importantly, the court adopted the O’Shea v. Littleton test for prospective
injunctive relief that Luckey had adopted in 1988: “the likelihood of substantial
and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.” 125
The court also noted that under this test, a plaintiff need not prove actual injury
when seeking prospective relief, but instead must only demonstrate “the
likelihood” of the injury. 126
Equally important, the court adopted the DOJ’s standard:
In setting forth a cause of action for prospective injunctive relief based upon
the constructive denial of counsel, to prove the “likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury,” the plaintiff should focus upon the following
factors: “(1) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers of
representation—such as timely and confidential consultation with clients,
appropriate investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the
prosecution's case—are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when

120. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Kuren, 146 A.3d 715 (Nos. 57 MAP
2015, 58 MAP 2015), 2015 WL 10768531, at *10–11.
121. Id. at *11.
122. Id. at *11–12.
123. Kuren, 146 A.3d at 742–43.
124. Id. at 743.
125. Id. at 744 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)); see Luckey v. Harris,
860 F.2d 1012, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 1988).
126. Kuren, 146 A.3d at 744.
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substantial structural limitations—such as a severe lack of resources,
unreasonably high workloads, or critical understaffing of public defender
127
offices—cause that absence or limitation on representation.”

The court noted that this standard offered “a workable, if non-exhaustive,
paradigm for weighing such claims.” 128 Like every court before it commenting
on this remedy, the court noted that plaintiffs’ burden under this standard “is a
weighty one.” 129
II. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE MAJOR POST-CRONIC/STRICKLAND
SYSTEMIC CASES
Although the Hurrell-Harring plaintiffs clearly stated their claim as a
systemic, risk-based claim envisioned by Luckey, there is no citation to Luckey
in that case. 130 The failure of the Hurrell-Harring court to consider Luckey’s
“likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury” standard for this
kind of systemic claim is fatal to its analysis for a number of reasons. Without
the benefit of Luckey’s risk-based analysis, the Hurrell-Harring court accepted
the defendants’ definition of plaintiffs’ claim as one that was “rooted in case
law conditioning relief for constitutionally ineffective assistance upon findings
that attorney performance, when viewed in its total, case specific aspect, has
both fallen below the standard of objective reasonableness and resulted in
prejudice.” 131
On its face, that claim is not susceptible of systemic application or class
action status, because, it is “rooted in the particular circumstances of an
individual case,” 132 and it is “contextually sensitive.” 133 Given that framing of
the issue before it, the court had little trouble finding that such a performancebased Strickland claim “cannot serve as a predicate for systemic relief”
because such a “highly context sensitive inquiry into the adequacy and
particular effect of counsel’s performance cannot occur until a prosecution has
concluded in a conviction.” 134
But the court did not want to leave the plaintiffs without a remedy for the
horrific tales of lawyer ineptitude (nominal representation) they had pled in
their amended class action complaint. The court noted that according to the

127. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Kuren, 146 A.3d 715
(Nos. 57 MAP 2015, 58 MAP 2015), 2015 WL 10768531, at *11).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 745.
130. See generally Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010).
131. Id. at 220 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)) (emphasis
added).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 225.
134. Id. at 220.
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complaint, ten of the twenty plaintiffs were “altogether without representation
at [the] arraignments” (nonrepresentation or actual denial of counsel). 135
Moreover, the plaintiffs had alleged that such actual denial of counsel was
“illustrative of what is a fairly common practice” that included defendants
being “unrepresented in subsequent proceedings where pleas are taken and
other critically important legal transactions take place.” 136
In addition to those allegations of outright nonrepresentation, the
complaint alleged that “although lawyers were eventually nominally appointed
for plaintiffs, they were unavailable to their clients” 137 in that,
• “they conferred with them little, if at all”;
• they “were often completely unresponsive to their [clients’] urgent
inquiries and requests from jail, sometimes for months on end”;
• they “waived important rights without consulting them”;
• they “ultimately appeared to do little more on [behalf of their clients]
than act as conduits for plea offers, some of which purportedly were
highly unfavorable”;
• they “missed court appearances”;
• “when they did appear they were not prepared to proceed, often because
they were entirely new to the case, the matters having previously been
handled by other similarly unprepared counsel”; and
• “the counsel [so] appointed . . . was seriously conflicted and . . .
unqualified.”138
Given these allegations in the complaint, the court found that “[t]he
questions properly raised in this Sixth Amendment-grounded action, we think,
go not to whether ineffectiveness has assumed systemic dimensions, but rather
to whether the State has met its foundational obligation under Gideon to
provide legal representation.” 139 “These allegations,” the court found, “state a
claim, not for ineffective assistance under Strickland, but for basic denial of
the right to counsel under Gideon.” 140
“The basic, unadorned question presented” by these claims, the court said,
was “whether the State has met its obligation to provide counsel, not whether
under all the circumstances counsel’s performance was inadequate or
135. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 220.
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added). This language is what leads me to argue the Hurrell-Harring term
“non-representation” is equivalent to actual denial of counsel and to consider the Hurrell-Harring
term “nominal” representation as equivalent to constructive denial of counsel.
138. Id. at 222.
139. Id. at 221–22.
140. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224. Just in case anyone missed that point, the court
stated later that “the complaint states a claim for constructive denial of the right to counsel by
reason of insufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon.” Id. at 225.
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prejudicial,” noting that Strickland had held that in the former cases prejudice
was presumed. 141
The court no doubt thought that once it had found a constructive denial
claim in the plaintiffs’ complaint that did not require a showing of prejudice, it
had solved the problem presented by the performance-based Strickland claim
of actual ineffectiveness that it thought plaintiffs had pled in their pre-trial
systemic challenge to an indigent defense system.
The indigent defense litigation that has been conducted since the HurrellHarring ruling is telling. A massive evidentiary presentation has been made in
both New York and Florida courts, consisting of a plethora of anecdotes,
documents, and reports, followed by expert testimony that such evidence
should suffice to establish a denial of “the foundational obligation to provide
counsel.” 142 However, neither case provides a principled analytical standard
that can be met with a focused evidentiary showing, nor does the proof and the
testimony in either case address a common question of law or fact, or provide
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. 143 In HurrellHarring, after seven years of litigation, a settlement on the eve of trial was
achieved for five counties, in which the State of New York for the first time
acknowledged its responsibility for public defense in that state and some
additional resources were obtained, among other reforms. 144
A Florida Supreme Court decision interpreted a state statute and
acknowledged the right of counsel with an excessive caseload to refuse
additional cases based on the Rules of Professional Conduct, but not the Sixth
Amendment. 145 A district court in Washington state found that four lawyers in
two small municipalities were constructively denying counsel to their clients
and ordered monitoring and reporting to ensure reform of the practices of those
lawyers. 146 In Missouri, public defenders have established a risk-based Rules

141. Id. at 225.
142. Id. at 222; Pub. Def., 11th Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla.
2013) (The court described the evidence: “[W]e are struck by the breadth and depth of the
evidence of how the excessive caseload has impacted the Public Defender’s representation of
indigent defendants.”). The author has conferred with both plaintiffs’ counsel and plaintiffs’
experts in Hurrell-Harring concerning the massive evidentiary presentation they were prepared to
make had the case gone to trial.
143. See infra Sections III and IV.
144. Joel Stashenko, Judge Approves Settlement Over Indigent Criminal Defense, N.Y.L.J.
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Judge%20Approves%20Settlement%20Over%20In
digent%20Criminal%20Defense%20-%20NYLJ%20031815.pdf [http://perma.cc/UZ3Z-TBJW].
145. Pub. Def., 115 So. 3d at 267, 279.
146. Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124, 1135–36 (W.D. Wash.
2013). I have no doubt that a trial judge could reliably and intelligently come to that conclusion
with respect to the performance of four lawyers in two small towns. This is what I call “the
illusion of a lawyer.” But it is not the stuff of systemic litigation that seeks to reform large
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of Professional Conduct claim, but not a risk-based Sixth Amendment
claim. 147
Duncan was decided in 2009, a year before Hurrell-Harring, although it is
not cited in Hurrell-Harring. 148 Duncan, presaging the argument presented
below, provides an “objective standard of reasonableness with respect to a
critical stage” test for a systemic challenge to a state’s indigent defense system,
and additionally requires a showing of “widespread and systemic” performance
deficiencies, leaving it to the trial court how to determine that. 149 While
Duncan did cite Luckey for the proposition that the two-pronged Strickland test
is inappropriate in a systemic case, it did not adopt Luckey’s risk-based test. 150
The recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Luzerne County,
on the other hand, expressly adopts the risk-based Luckey standard. 151 The
decision also measurably improves upon Hurrell-Harring’s “foundational
Gideon obligation” statement of the applicable standard for prospective
injunctive relief in a systemic case, specifically noting that under the U.S.
Supreme Court’s O’Shea v. Littleton test, adopted by Luckey, plaintiffs in these
systemic cases need not prove actual injury. 152 Luzerne County’s adoption of
Luckey’s risk-based test and its more specific articulation of the constructive
denial test are significant steps forward for this theory of recovery.
However, even with the Luzerne County improvements to the constructive
denial claim, we emerge from these cases with no principled analytical
standard that can be met with a focused evidentiary showing using reliable data
and analytics needed to certify a class and prevail on the merits in a pre-trial
class action challenge to a state’s indigent defense system. In the following
sections, I argue that a constructive denial claim is an insufficiently principled
and an exorbitantly expensive vehicle for use in a large class action challenge
to a state’s system of indigent defense. It was crafted by a court, not by
experienced counsel. It is an entirely appropriate vehicle for individual claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, but it cannot serve as a viable claim for

indigent defense systems, as has been done for decades with traditional institutional class action
litigation in other similar systems.
147. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 607, 612 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
148. See generally Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
149. Id. at 123–24.
150. Id. at 128–29.
151. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 743 (Pa. 2016).
152. Id. at 748. The test as adopted by Luckey requires plaintiffs to show “the likelihood of
substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.” Luckey v.
Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d
673 (11th Cir. 1992).
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relief in systemic Sixth Amendment challenges to state indigent defense
systems. 153
III. CLASS CERTIFICATION CONCERNS AFTER WAL-MART V. DUKES
Hurrell-Harring was an appeal from an order denying a motion to
dismiss. 154 In this opinion the court did not consider the question of whether or
not the case could be certified as a class action, but rather simply referred to
the plaintiffs’ allegations of “broad systemic deficiencies.” 155 The case was
subsequently brought as a class action, and in a subsequent opinion, an
intermediate appellate court reversed a trial court ruling and allowed class
certification in this case. 156 The court found the criteria in New York for class
action status “must be liberally construed and ‘any error, if there is to be one,
should be . . . in favor of allowing the class action.’” 157 The court further noted
that in order to prove their claim, the plaintiffs would now be “saddled with the
enormous task of establishing that deprivations of counsel to indigent
defendants are not simply isolated occurrences in the case of these 20
plaintiffs, but are a common or routine happenstance in the [five upstate New
York] counties.” 158
This favorable class certification ruling was issued on January 6, 2011. 159
A little more than five months later, on June 20, 2011, the United States
Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart v. Dukes. 160 The days of “liberal
construction” of the class action rule, if they ever existed, were coming to an
abrupt end. In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court addressed the rigorous analysis
required to meet the commands of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 161 “The crux of this case,” Justice Scalia wrote for the Wal-Mart
majority, “is commonality—the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there
are questions of law or fact common to the class.’” 162
153. As a judicial construct, a constructive denial of counsel claim exists in an individual case
only in relation to the actual denial of counsel, and not to any higher or different standard. In
other words, a constructive denial claim exists only when counsel’s performance in an individual
case is so devoid of substance that it is tantamount to actual denial of counsel and therefore
counsel’s conduct is “declared such by judicial construction or interpretation.” See supra note 18.
This is an incredibly high bar for determining whether counsel’s conduct passes constitutional
muster.
154. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219 (N.Y. 2010).
155. Id. at 225.
156. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 914 N.Y.S. 367, 369, 372 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
157. Id. at 369 (citing Pruitt v. Rockefeller Ctr. Props., 574 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1991)).
158. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 367.
160. 564 U.S. 338, 338 (2011).
161. Id. at 345.
162. Id. at 349 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD REQUIRED TO PREVAIL

645

Under Wal-Mart, “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” 163 Their claims must
depend on a “common contention” and that common contention “must be of
such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” 164 The Court emphasized that
what matters in class certification is not just a common issue, but “the capacity
of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation.” 165
The issues in the kind of “systemic” constructive denial claim created by
the Hurrell-Harring court, we are told by that court, include:
• whether counsel were communicative with their clients;
• whether any such attorney-client relationship may really be said to have
existed between many (not all) of the plaintiffs and the putative
attorneys;
• whether counsel made virtually no efforts on their nominal clients’
behalf; and
• whether counsel waived important rights without authorization from the
clients. 166
It is difficult to conceive of a claim that is more deeply “rooted in the
particular circumstances of an individualized case,” 167 and that will inevitably
involve a “highly context sensitive inquiry into the adequacy and particular
effect of counsel’s performance.” 168 But that kind of individualized and
context sensitive inquiry is simply inapposite to the post-Wal-Mart world,
where plaintiffs seeking class certification must, as noted above, demonstrate
that: (a) they have suffered the same injury; (b) their claims depend upon a
common contention that is capable of classwide resolution; (c) determination
of their claims’ truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of their claims in a single stroke; and (d) their case will
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. 169
After Wal-Mart, it is extremely unlikely that the constructive denial claim
described by the Hurrell-Harring court could survive the rigorous judicial
analysis required to certify a class. The proof in such cases is a series of
anecdotes (lawyers confer “little, if at all,” with their clients; are “completely

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 349–50 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
Id. at 350.
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original).
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 224 (N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 220.
Id.
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
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unresponsive to their clients’ urgent inquiries;” etc. 170), together with
voluminous documents and reports, caseload statistics, and perhaps the 1973
NAC Standards 171 and expert testimony, all of which together is claimed to
constitute a massive evidentiary showing of a systemic violation of the
“foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal representation,”
whatever that may mean to any particular trial judge or reviewing court. 172
The Hurrell-Harring court’s various descriptions of the constructive denial
claim (“a foundational obligation . . . to provide [counsel]”; “the basic denial
of the right to counsel”; and “insufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate of Gideon” 173) make it virtually impossible to articulate a definable
common claim capable of judicial resolution on a class-wide basis. To
paraphrase Justice Marshall, dissenting in Strickland, “[f]or the most part the
[Hurrell-Harring] majority’s efforts are unhelpful” because the constructive
denial standard is “so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at
all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth
Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts.” 174 Or, to
paraphrase Justice Stevens in Cronic, the Hurrell-Harring court’s creation of a
systemic or class action constructive denial claim cannot “survive the crucible
of meaningful adversarial testing” 175 now required by Wal-Mart. 176
But what about Luzerne County’s articulation of a “totality of
circumstances” standard for a systemic constructive denial case?
Unfortunately, it is almost surely doomed to the same post-Wal-Mart fate. The
court in Luzerne County adopted the DOJ’s proposed two-pronged test to
evaluate a systemic constructive denial of counsel claim:
(1) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers of representation—
such as timely and confidential consultation with clients, appropriate
investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case—
are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when substantial structural

170. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222.
171. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: The Defense,
NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEF. ASS’N (1973), http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/nac_standards
forthedefense_1973.pdf [http://perma.cc/4LVU-7TT3].
172. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222.
173. Id. at 222, 224–25.
174. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
176. Wal-Mart, a case that originated in a federal district court and involved an interpretation
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is binding law now in all federal courts and
will undoubtedly trickle down through the state courts interpreting state class action rules similar
or identical to Rule 23, as have most major Supreme Court class action cases interpreting Rule
23(b)(2) regarding injunctive and declaratory relief. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345. See Duncan v.
State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); see also Price v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 960, 966,
969 (La. 2011) (adoption of Wal-Mart’s commonality analysis by the Louisiana Supreme Court
to deny class certification).
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limitations—such as a severe lack of resources . . . —cause that absence or
177
limitation on representation.

Again, it is difficult to conceive of a test more deeply rooted in the
particular circumstances of individual cases. It is extremely unlikely that such
a claim could ever meet the “common contention” command of Rule 23(a)(2)
in a post-Wal-Mart world. Plaintiffs manifestly have not suffered the same
injury, their claims do not depend upon a common contention capable of classwide resolution, the determination of their claims’ truth or falsity will not
resolve an issue central to the validity of each one of their claims in a single
stroke, and their case will not generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation. Unfortunately, the claim in any constructive denial
case, no matter how well formulated, is essentially a “totality of the
circumstances” claim, which is simply no longer the stuff of class action
litigation after Wal-Mart.
Class certification cases decided since Wal-Mart make it clear that WalMart is a watershed case in class certification law. For instance, in M.D. ex rel
Stukenberg v. Perry, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court’s pre-Wal-Mart
reasoning in certifying a class of children in foster care in Texas, finding that
the district court did not conduct the “rigorous analysis” required by Wal-Mart
to certify a class under Rule 23(a)(2), 178 and noting that Wal-Mart has “further
defined the contours of the ‘rigorous analysis’ required by Rules 23(a) and
23(b)(2).” 179
The district court in M.D. relied on pre-Wal-Mart law that “[t]he test for
commonality is not demanding.” 180 The Fifth Circuit rejected that notion,
finding that “[a]lthough the district court’s analysis may have been a
reasonable application of pre-Wal-Mart precedent, the Wal-Mart decision has
heightened the standards for establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2),
rendering the district court’s analysis insufficient.” 181 “After Wal-Mart,” the
Fifth Circuit observed, “Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement demands
more than the presentation of questions that are common to the class because
‘any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common
questions.’” 182

177. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715
(Pa. 2016), (No. 57 MAP 2015), 2015 WL 10768531, at *11.
178. 675 F.3d 832, 838 (5th Cir. 2012).
179. Id. at 837.
180. Id. at 839 (alteration in original).
181. Id.
182. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter M.D.].
The order certifying the class in Wilbur, entered about eight months after the Supreme Court’s
Wal-Mart decision, lists four “common questions,” and then cites Wal-Mart. However, there is
simply no analysis of how those four “common questions” survive the rigorous analysis now
required by Wal-Mart, other than the conclusory statement that, “The answers to most, if not all,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

648

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:625

On remand in M.D., plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification
and changed the nature of their claims substantially. In their original complaint
plaintiffs asserted various “systemic failures” in the state’s system for the care
of children in the care of the state. 183 In response to the Fifth Circuit’s denial of
class certification for those claims, plaintiffs proposed several subclasses and
changed their allegations, asserting that the defendants’ policies deprived them
of their right to be free from an unreasonable risk of harm while in the state’s
custody. 184 The district court granted class certification on the plaintiffs’
revised claims. 185
After Wal-Mart, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that all of the class members’
claims depend on a common issue of law or fact whose resolution “will resolve
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the [class member’s]
claims in one stroke.” 186 The variety of the individual indigent defendant’s
complaints about their individual lawyer’s performances set out by the
Hurrell-Harring court cannot pass this test in a post-Wal-Mart world. Simply
characterizing the plaintiffs’ claim as one asserting “systemic deficiencies,” as
the court did in Hurrell-Harring, 187 will no longer suffice to meet the “rigorous
analysis” required for class certification under Rule 23(a)(2) after Wal-Mart.
IV. A RISK-BASED CLAIM FOR SYSTEMIC SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
My central argument in this article is that in order to prevail on a pre-trial
claim asserting systemic Sixth Amendment violations and seeking systemic
prospective injunctive relief, courts should require plaintiffs to prove that there
is a significant likelihood (or risk) of substantial and immediate injury to the
class—that is, prejudice, at both plea 188 and trial 189—because the defendants
lack the capacity to provide to the class reasonably effective assistance of
counsel under prevailing professional norms at all critical stages of the

of these questions will be capable of classwide resolution.” Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 298
F.R.D. 665, 667 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
183. M.D., 675 F.3d at 835.
184. Id. This is precisely the risk-based kind of claim I argue for in Section IV below.
185. M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 66 (S.D. Tex. 2013). The Fifth Circuit dismissed the State’s
Rule 23(f) petition to appeal the class certification order as untimely in an unpublished order.
M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 547 Fed. Appx. 543, 544 (2013). The author wishes to thank
Mario H. Nguyen, Harvard Law School, J.D. Candidate 2017 for pointing out this development in
M.D. to me after a lecture I gave to his class recently.
186. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
187. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 225 (N.Y. 2010).
188. “A reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been
more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.” Missouri
v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012).
189. “[A] reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s professional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1983).
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proceeding. 190 There is no requirement to show actual prejudice. 191 This is
what I call a risk-based claim asserting systemic Sixth Amendment violations,
as opposed to the performance-based claim of actual ineffectiveness asserted
by the plaintiffs in Luckey and appropriately rejected by that court.
Stated more succinctly, I argue that the appropriate test for a class action
systemic challenge to an indigent defense system is simply this: a significant
risk of prejudice due to systemic inability to perform. The Luckey court
rejected performance-based claims of actual ineffectiveness for pre-trial class
action claims seeking prospective injunctive relief and presaged the kind of
risk-based pre-trial class action claim for systemic Sixth Amendment
violations that I describe here. 192
A risk-based claim differs significantly from a performance-based claim.
The best example of a risk-based class action claim that I know of is Gates v.
Cook. 193 In Gates, death row prisoners at Mississippi’s infamous Parchman
Farm (Mississippi State Penitentiary) brought a class action complaining that
horrific conditions of confinement posed intolerable risks to their health,
including the risk of serious heat-related injury or death during the scorching
summers in the Mississippi Delta, when the Heat Index in death row cells
sometimes exceeded 130º F. 194 The inmates claimed that those conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment. 195
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they show deliberate
indifference to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to the

190. Frye, 566 U.S. at 140.
191. There is also a requirement to prove that any remedies at law are inadequate, but the
courts after Luckey considering Sixth Amendment challenges in systemic cases have little trouble
finding that individual post-trial motions to set aside individual convictions are an inadequate
remedy at law for systemic deficiencies. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d
1122, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
192. Duncan similarly articulated such a test: i.e., plaintiffs must show that counsel’s
performance “falls below an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to a critical stage
in the proceedings.” Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 123 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). The court
added that plaintiffs must show that such performance deficiencies are “widespread and
systemic.” Id. The Duncan court also noted: “[S]imply being deprived of the constitutional right
to effective representation at a critical stage in the proceedings, in and of itself, gives rise to
harm.” Id. at 127. It is tempting to substitute the risk of ineffectiveness at a critical stage for the
risk of prejudice that I am proposing here, but there are several reasons not to do so. First, I think
such a standard involves far more factual and legal complexity than prejudice. Second, the odds
are against that standard’s surviving a post-Wal-Mart class certification analysis. Third, we need
not employ that standard since we can now convincingly prove the risk of prejudice with reliable
data and analytics. Finally, there is good reason to believe that the courts will be much more
receptive to a risk of prejudice standard.
193. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004). The author served as co-counsel for
plaintiffs on this case.
194. Id. at 327.
195. Id.
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inmate by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. 196 In Gates, we
amply met our burden of proving deliberate indifference by showing that the
risk to health from excessive heat was so obvious that prison officials must
have been actually aware of the risks, yet failed to take reasonable measures in
response. 197
The state argued that we had not and could not show a substantial risk of
serious harm because there was no proof that any death row inmate at
Parchman had ever died or suffered serious injury from excessive heat. 198 And
indeed, the record supported that contention. But our medical expert
persuasively testified that it was “very likely” that, under the conditions then
existing on Death Row, an inmate would die or suffer serious injury from heat
stroke or some other heat related illness due to excessive heat in the cells. 199
Importantly for our purposes here, the Fifth Circuit held that an inmate
need not show that death or serious illness from heat exposure has occurred in
order to prevail. 200 “It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who
plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the
ground that nothing yet had happened to them.” 201 All that the inmates need to
show is that the conditions pose a substantial risk of serious harm. 202
Similarly, here, in order to prevail in a class action case asserting a
systemic risk-based Sixth Amendment claim and seeking prospective
injunctive relief, plaintiffs need only prove that there is a likelihood (or risk) of
substantial and immediate injury to the class. In this risk-based claim, that risk
is prejudice due to systematic inability to provide reasonably effective
assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms to the class.
There is no requirement to show actual prejudice.
But will the kind of risk-based claim that I argue for here stand up under
critical analysis? We return to Missouri to begin that analysis. As noted above,
in Waters, the Missouri Supreme Court sustained the public defender’s claim
for denial of reasonably effective assistance of counsel, but did not adopt the

196. Id. at 333 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994)).
197. Id. at 335.
198. Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 16, Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-60529), 2003 WL 23783285, at *16.
199. Gates, 376 F.3d at 339. The expert also testified that the inmates had complained of
symptoms commonly recognized to be related to heat-related illnesses, but that these symptoms
had simply gone undiagnosed. Id. Sound familiar?
200. Id.
201. Id. at 333 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). Luzerne County
similarly held that under the O’Shea v. Littleton test adopted by Luckey, when seeking
prospective relief, a plaintiff need not prove actual injury. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715,
748 (Pa. 2016). See also M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 45 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
202. Gates, 376 F.3d at 339.
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risk-based Luckey analysis that the public defender urged. 203 The court also
sustained the public defender’s risk-based Rules of Professional Conduct claim
that excessive caseloads produced concurrent conflict under Rule 1.7 (“a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client”). 204 The court also
found no infirmity in the public defender’s duly promulgated rule and protocol
for case refusal. 205
The Waters decision was issued on July 31, 2012. 206 The Missouri Public
Defender immediately began to refuse additional appointments pursuant to its
duly promulgated rule. 207 However, in October 2012, Missouri State Auditor
Thomas A. Schweich, in a routine audit of the Missouri Public Defender,
rejected the public defender’s caseload protocol which had been upheld in
Waters as part of a presumptively valid rule. 208 The Missouri State Auditor
held the rule did not have sufficient support since the rule was based
substantially on caseload numbers recommended by the 1973 National
Advisory Commission that were not evidence based. 209 The Missouri Public
Defender then stopped implementing its case refusal rule and protocol. 210
National indigent defense expert Norman Lefstein, in his Executive Summary
and Recommendations: Securing Reasonable Caseloads, specifically
recommended that henceforth public defenders “should not rely upon” the
1973 NAC Standards. 211
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
(SCLAID) then retained Rubin Brown, one of the nation’s leading accounting
and professional consulting firms, to perform a rigorous analysis of the
workload of the Missouri Public Defender using the Delphi method that had
been introduced by researchers at the Rand Corporation in 1962. 212 The Delphi

203. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
204. Id. at 607.
205. Id. at 612.
206. Id. at 592.
207. Missouri State Auditor Report, MO. PUB. DEF. SYS. 7 (2012), http://app.auditor.mo.gov/
repository/press/2012-129.pdf [http://perma.cc/2U7W-UTK5].
208. Id. at 11.
209. Id. at 14.
210. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEF. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2015),
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/about/FY2015AnnualReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/222B-AX
RM].
211. Norman Lefstein, Executive Summary and Recommendations: Securing Reasonable
Caseloads, A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 34 (2012),
http://texaswcl.tamu.edu/reports/2011_LefsteinExecSummary.pdf [http://perma.cc/NF3Q-M6
YK].
212. RUBIN BROWN LLP, THE MISSOURI PROJECT REPORT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI
PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 5 (2014), http://www.a
mericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_
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method has been peer reviewed and found to be an effective tool for producing
a reliable consensus of expert opinion. As applied to the workload of a public
defender, the Delphi method asks both experienced public defenders and
experienced private criminal defense attorneys to provide a consensus estimate
of the amount of time defense counsel should expect to spend on each
designated Case Task in each of the designated Case Types in order to provide
reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional
norms. 213
The Missouri Project Report was published in February of 2014. 214 The
Missouri Project Report has been described as a “watershed moment” for
indigent defense. 215 Upon the release of the report, ABA President James
Silkenat stated, “It can now be more reliably demonstrated than ever before
that for decades the American legal profession has been rendering an enormous
disservice to indigent clients and to the criminal justice system in a way that
can no longer be tolerated.” 216 A similar workload study using the Delphi
method was completed in Texas in 2015 and four more workload studies are
being conducted in Louisiana, Tennessee, Colorado, and Rhode Island, with
similar studies under consideration in other states. 217
The most pertinent results of The Missouri Project Report are the vast
discrepancies between the actual time worked by public defenders (determined
from analyses of the timekeeping data generated by these public defenders)
and the time determined by the expert Delphi panels (experienced criminal
defenders, both private and public) required to provide reasonably effective
assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms. 218 This table

missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/QSP8-5CEQ] [hereinafter Missouri
Project Report]. The Delphi method has been peer reviewed and found to be a reliable tool for
producing a reliable consensus of expert opinion. Id. at 17. The Missouri Public Defender used
the Missouri Project Report to obtain its largest increase in funding in fifteen years from a twothirds Republican Legislature, and when the Democratic Governor vetoed that bill, the
Legislature overrode that veto—three times—and the Democratic Governor then impounded the
funds—three times. Letter from Michael Barrett to Governor Jay Nixon (Aug. 2, 2016),
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/Newsfeed/Delegation_of_Representation.PDF [http://perma.
cc/KQY2-LTBQ].
213. Missouri Project Report, supra note 212, at 19.
214. Id. at 2.
215. Andrew Davies, How Do We “Do Data” in Public Defense?, 78 ALBANY L. REV. 1179,
1179–92 (2015).
216. National Association for Public Defense, Letter to Chairman Grassley and Senator
Leahy (May 19, 2015), http://www.publicdefenders.us/files/Letter_to_Chairman_Grassley_and_
Senator_Leahy_May%2019%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VG4-4VYU].
217. Id.
218. Missouri Project Report, supra note 212, at 6.
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demonstrates some of the most notable findings from the Missouri Project
Report219:
CASE TYPE
Misdemeanor
A/B Felony
C/D Felony
Sex Felony

ACTUAL TIME
2.3
8.7
4.4
25.6

CONSENSUS EXPERT TIME
11.7
47.6
25.0
63.8

The results for the remaining four Case Types (all eight Case Types have
fourteen Case Tasks each) are similarly stark. 220 The published results from the
Texas study and the preliminary results from the other studies now being
conducted are also similarly stark. 221 The consequences for both legislative
advocacy for additional funding and judicial intervention in the event that
funding is not forthcoming are both obvious and remarkable.
The Missouri Project Report provides the factual predicate for a risk-based
claim for systemic Sixth Amendment violations. The principal question
presented to the Delphi panel of experienced experts is, for each Case Task in
each Case Type: how much time is reasonably required in order to provide
reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional
norms? 222
The expert panel of experienced criminal practitioners in the Delphi study
are presented with the applicable law and standards for the study to guide their
professional judgment about the amount of time that is reasonably required to
provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing
professional norms, much in the way a jury is presented with instructions to
guide their judgment. As noted above, Strickland cited the prevailing
professional norms reflected in the CJS Defense Function Standards as “guides
to determining what is reasonable,” specifically disclaiming any “particular set
of detailed rules” as appropriate for this task and ultimately endorsing the
“reasonably effective assistance” standard. 223 A quarter century later in Padilla
v. Kentucky the Supreme Court reiterated that “prevailing norms of practice as
reflected in American Bar Association Standards” are not only “guides to
determining what is reasonable,” but also “valuable measures of the prevailing
professional norms of effective representation.” 224

219. Id. at 23–24.
220. Id. at 23–26.
221. Texas Indigent Defense Commission, Guidelines for Indigent Defense Caseloads (Jan.
2015), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/150122_weightedcl_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/PZ
3S-KCDM].
222. Missouri Project Report, supra note 212, at 11.
223. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
224. 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010).
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Notably, in Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court found that “ninety-four
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas,” citing Department of
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics. 225 The court quoted a Yale Law Journal
article approvingly: “[P]lea bargaining . . . is not some adjunct to the criminal
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” 226
For that reason, the experts on the Delphi panel are advised by the ABA
Project Leader of that Supreme Court finding along with the ABA’s Criminal
Justice Section Defense Function Standard 4-6.1(b), which sets out the
prevailing professional norm for defense counsel’s duty to explore disposition
without trial (plea). 227 That standard provides that “in every criminal matter,
defense counsel should consider the individual circumstances of the case and
of the client, and should not recommend acceptance of a plea to a client unless
and until appropriate investigation and study of the matter has been
completed,” including:
• Discussion with the client;
• An analysis of relevant law;
• An analysis of the prosecutor’s evidence;
• An analysis of potential dispositions; and
• An analysis of relevant collateral consequences. 228
In Louisiana, for example, such a workload study has been conducted by
the ABA and Postlethwaite & Netterville (P&N), Louisiana’s largest public
accounting firm. 229 From this study, the Louisiana Project report was co-issued
by the ABA and P&N on February 17, 2017. 230 The conclusion of the
Louisiana Project report is nothing less than stunning:
At this workload, and to be in compliance with the Delphi panel’s consensus
opinions, 3,679,792 hours (approximately 1,769 public defenders are required
to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing

225. 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
226. Id. (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stunz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original).
227. ABA’s Criminal Justice Section Defense Function, Standard 4-6.1(b) (1991).
228. Id. This protocol, including utilization of CJS Defense Function Standard 4-6.1(b), is
now being employed in ABA Delphi studies in Louisiana, Colorado, Tennessee, and Rhode
Island; was employed in Missouri and Texas; and will be employed in all such future workload
studies.
229. Louisiana Public Defender Board, Memorandum to Public Defenders on Workload Study
and Statewide Case Refusal Motions, 1–2 (Mar. 18, 2016), http://lpdb.la.gov/Serving%20The%20
Public/News/txtfiles/pdf/LPDB%20Memo%20to%20Defenders_3_18_2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9PU2-4SJG].
230. See The Louisiana Project: A Study of the Louisiana Defender System and Attorney
Workload Standards, POSTLETHWAITE & NETTERVILLE and THE A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE
ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS (Feb. 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/images/abanews/LouisianaProjectReportFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/HRE9-Q4B3].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARD REQUIRED TO PREVAIL

655

professional norms in Louisiana to meet the annual public defense workloads
for these Case Types. As of October 31, 2016, the Louisiana public defense
system employed approximately 363 FTE public defenders. Therefore, the
Delphi method’s process indicates the Louisiana public defense system is
currently deficient 1,406 FTE attorneys. Alternatively, based on the Delphi
Method’s results and analysis presented herein, the Louisiana public defense
system only has the capacity to handle 21 percent of the workload in
231
compliance with the Delphi panel’s consensus opinions.

Louisiana public defenders, armed with the results of the ABA/P&N
workload study, now have compelling evidence and reliable data and analytics
to establish that there is a significant likelihood (or risk) of substantial and
immediate injury to their clients—that is, prejudice, at both plea and trial 232—
because they are systematically unable to provide reasonably effective
assistance of counsel under prevailing professional norms, in that they have
only 21% of the lawyers that needed to do that. 233 Of course, a class of the
public defenders’ clients will now have that same reliable data and analytics
available from this public report to serve as the factual predicate for any class
action claim asserting a risk-based claim for systemic Sixth Amendment
violations against the Louisiana Public Defender Board, on whose behalf the
study was undertaken. 234
Moreover, this risk-based claim for systemic Sixth Amendment
violations—significant risk of prejudice due to systemic inability to perform—
supported by this reliable data and analytics, will readily withstand the
“rigorous analysis” now required to meet the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a)(2) for class certification in a post-Wal-Mart world, 235 because:
• Plaintiffs have suffered the same injury: significant risk of prejudice;
• Plaintiffs’ claims depend on a “common contention” that is of such a
nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution: based on the results of
the ABA/P&N workload study, the entire class can show they are and
will be represented by public defenders who are handing almost five
times more cases than they should, and who are therefore incapable of
providing reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to
prevailing professional norms to each member of the class; 236 and
• This class-wide proceeding has the capacity to generate common
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation: an order that is the

231. Id. at 2.
232. See supra notes 188 and 189.
233. The Louisiana Project, supra note 230, at 2.
234. Id. at Preface.
235. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 250 (2011). See also M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7,
29 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
236. See The Louisiana Project, supra note 230, at 3.
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functional equivalent of a permanent structural injunction directing each
public defender to decline further appointments until their workload is
no more than their capacity to provide reasonably effective assistance of
counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms, as determined by the
ABA/P&N workload study. 237
Louisiana Public Defenders will also have available reliable data and
analytics to demonstrate that they cannot continue to accept the grossly
unreasonable workloads that they are currently carrying because to continue to
do so creates a “significant risk” that the representation of one or more of their
clients will be materially limited by that lawyer’s responsibilities to another
client, in violation of Rule 1.7 of the ABA and Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct. 238
There is also a compelling risk-based Holloway v. Arkansas 239 right to
conflict-free counsel claim that can constitutionalize the Rule 1.7 claim. The
ABA/P&N study will demonstrate that because of their excessive workloads
each public defender’s representation of any one client is in fact materially
limited by their representation of their other clients, and vice versa. Each of
their clients is entitled to conflict-free counsel under Holloway and its progeny,
and none of their clients have such concurrent conflict-free counsel under Rule
1.7. Thus, there is a significant risk that each public defender’s concurrent
conflict will significantly affect their performance, resulting in prejudice, at
both plea 240 and trial. 241
Note that all three claims involve risk analyses: significant risk of
concurrent conflict in the Rules of Professional Conduct claim; significant risk
of prejudice in the conflict-free counsel claim and significant risk of prejudice
and the Sixth Amendment claim. None of these three risk-based claims require
proof of actual harm or injury; i.e., prejudice.
The proof in this kind of rigorously analytical and structured risk-based
claim differs dramatically from the proof presented in the traditional
constructive denial case. The proof in each of the three risk-based claims
articulated here will focus on the ABA/P&N workload study, supported by
expert testimony from both a law and standards expert (ABA) and an
econometrics expert (P&N) about the validity, reliability, process and results
of the study. If the court accepts the expert testimony that the workload study

237. Id.
238. See State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
239. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
240. “A reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been
more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.” Missouri
v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).
241. Upon a showing that the concurrent conflict affected counsel’s performance, the verdict
is deemed unreliable and prejudice is presumed. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)
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is valid and reliable, little else remains to be shown in order to prevail on the
risk-based Rule 1.7 claim, the risk-based conflict-free counsel claim and the
risk-based Sixth Amendment claim. 242
That is so because it is virtually self-evident that any professional—doctor,
lawyer, engineer, architect, airline pilot, etc. who is doing almost five times as
much work as he or she should—is simply incapable of providing reasonably
effective professional services under prevailing professional norms to each of
their clients or patients or passengers, and therefore there is a significant risk of
harm to every one of their clients or patients or passengers. If airline pilots did
that, terrible things would happen. If obstetricians did that, terrible things
would happen. When public defenders do that, terrible things happen.
In short, when public defenders have workloads that are almost five times
their capacity to handle competently, there is a significant risk that: (a) the
representation of every one of their clients will be materially limited by their
responsibilities to every one of their other clients (systemic Rule 1.7 violation);
(b) their Rule 1.7 concurrent conflict will result in prejudice in both cases that
end in pleas and those that end in trials 243 (systemic Holloway v. Arkansas
violation); and (c) their systemic inability to perform will result in prejudice in
both cases that end in pleas and those that end in trials 244 (systemic Sixth
Amendment violation).
These Rule 1.7, Holloway, and Sixth Amendment claims exist in systemic
cases even though one or more such public defenders may, from time to time,
by triaging their cases and pushing resources to one or more of their cases,
provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing
professional norms to one or more of their clients. That is so because such
triaging is unethical and unconstitutional under Rule 1.7, Holloway, and the
Sixth Amendment. When public defenders have workloads that are almost five
times their capacity to handle competently, each one of them is unavoidably
acting unethically and unconstitutionally at all times and at every moment of
the day because of their unethical Rule 1.7 concurrent conflicts with every one
of their clients and their resulting inability to provide conflict-free and
reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional
norms to each one of their clients.
The relief requested in a case refusal case (as well as a class action case
asserting a risk-based claim of systemic Sixth Amendment violations) is

242. Notably, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana has recently upheld the right
and duty of a chief public defender to refuse a trial court appointment to a case because his
extensive duties as head of an office facing increasing caseloads and a shrinking budget meant
that such an appointment would likely run afoul of both Rule 1.7 and the Sixth Amendment. State
v. Singleton, No. 2015-K-1099, 2016 WL 3012793, at *17 (4th Cir. 2016).
243. See supra notes 240 and 241.
244. See supra notes 188 and 189.
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simple and straightforward. The court is requested to enter an order permitting
(or requiring in the class action case) each public defender involved to decline
appointments in any case until, utilizing the analytics referred to above, each
public defender’s workload is no greater than their capacity to handle
competently. 245 Regular reports of each public defender’s workload are to be
filed with the court every thirty days, and the court will review each public
defender’s workload to ensure that each public defender’s workload is no
greater than his or her capacity to handle competently before making
appointments. In the event no public defender or other competent lawyer is
available to represent any one or more indigent defendants on the court’s
docket, the case against such an indigent defendant should be dismissed, and if
the defendant is in custody, he or she should be released. The court should
retain jurisdiction of the case to enforce its order.
The state will then have the opportunity to choose what it wishes to do
with the limited resources it is now providing for public defense. Until the state
decides whether it wishes to provide more lawyers and investigators (supplyside solution) or to decriminalize current criminal code provisions that have no
public safety consequences 246 (demand-side solution), or both, judges will
necessarily have to prioritize cases on their dockets, exercising their inherent
power to control their dockets, by assigning counsel to the highest priority,
high risk cases, and dismissing those lower risk, lower priority cases where
competent and effective counsel cannot be found. 247 Those defendants in
custody in such cases must be released.
Our clients (public defenders in case refusal litigation, indigent defendants
in class action cases) are entitled to judicial relief long before the system
deteriorates all the way down to constructive denial of counsel (“nominal
representation”), with lawyers who confer little, if at all, with them, and who
are “often completely unresponsive to their urgent inquiries and requests from

245. For a suggestion of such an injunction, see State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 612 (Mo.
2012) (en banc).
246. Many of these criminal code provisions involve the criminalization of poverty,
homelessness, mental illness, and addiction that has occurred over the course of the last thirty
years. These criminal code provisions could be far more effective in deterring and modifying the
behavior involved if they were made civil code violations (with no statutory collateral
consequences), where social workers, not lawyers, could provide services to those charged far
more effectively and efficiently. Rebecca L. Brown, Decriminalizing Mental Illness: The Need
for Treatment Over Incarceration Before Prisons Become the New Asylums for the Mentally Ill,
DIGITAL COMMONS @ URSINIS COLLEGE, July 24, 2015 at 3, 7–9, http://digitalcommons.ursinus.
edu/psych_sum/1?utm_source=digitalcommons.ursinus.edu%2Fpsych_sum%2F1&utm_medium
=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages [http://perma.cc/Q8PG-NV5M].
247. See, e.g., Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 612.
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jail, sometimes for months on end,” two of the most egregious of the parade of
horribles detailed by the court in Hurrell-Harring. 248
The American Bar Association filed an amicus brief in Luzerne County
asking the court to recognize a cause of action where public defender
workloads and lack of funding prevent indigent defendants from receiving the
“actual, non-trivial representation that Gideon demands.” 249 Actual, non-trivial
representation is a long way from reasonably effective assistance of counsel
under prevailing professional norms. While this brief may have more
accurately described the constructive denial standard than anyone else, that is
not the standard that anyone, particularly this class of exclusively poor,
primarily black and brown people, deserves.
Let me put it another way. If “ideal” is one hundred and “reasonably
effective” is sixty and “constructive denial” is ten and “actual denial” is zero,
why would we ever say that our clients are not entitled to any judicial relief
until and unless we can prove that the system has deteriorated all the way
down to ten? Why wouldn’t we say that our clients are entitled to judicial relief
once the system dips below sixty? And if we give the courts the choice, which
number do you think they will pick?
V. DISMISS AND RELEASE: THE BROWN V. PLATA ANALOG
Recently in Louisiana, a trial court issued a “dismiss and release” order in
a case involving denial of counsel altogether, staying its order pending
appeal. 250 The stay order was probably a wise and prudent decision, and such a
stay order would probably be a wise and prudent decision if a similar dismiss
and release order were issued in the risk-based class action Sixth Amendment
claim I have articulated in this article. But we should never disavow a “dismiss
and release” order simply because our opponents are sure to claim that the sky
will fall (“Dangerous criminals will be released onto our streets!”) if we
conform our conduct to the commands of the Constitution.
Such an argument fell on deaf ears in the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Plata, the California statewide class action claim based on overcrowding in the
California prison system. 251 The case started in 1990 as a claim on behalf of
248. 930 N.E.2d 217, 222 (N.Y. 2010).
249. Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curie Supporting Appellants at 2, Kuren
v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016) (No. 57 MAP 2015, No. 58 MAP 2015), 2015 WL
10818715, at *1.
250. State v. Bernard, No. 528-021, at *11 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Orl., Sec. K, Apr. 8, 2016).
The court found that the absence of a date certain as to when adequate funding would be made
available by the legislature for constitutionally mandated representation of defendants who cannot
afford an attorney violates the Sixth Amendment. Subject to the stay order, the prosecutions were
to be halted and the defendants were to be released immediately, but the charges were not
dropped. Id.
251. 563 U.S. 493, 501–02 (2011).
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prisoners with serious mental illness who were not receiving minimally
adequate mental health care. 252 But in 2007, a Special Master appointed to
oversee the state’s remedial efforts first reported to the court that mental health
care in the California prisons was deteriorating due to increased
overcrowding. 253 A remedial consent decree was entered, but when the state
had not complied with the decree by 2005, the court appointed a receiver to
oversee remedial efforts to reduce overcrowding. 254
A three-judge court then ordered the state of California to reduce its
population to 137.5% of capacity within two years. 255 California prisons were
operating at approximately 200% at the time of the decision. 256 The Supreme
Court affirmed the three judge court’s mandated population limit and found
that it was necessary to remedy the violation of the prisoner’s constitutional
rights to protection from harm under the Eighth Amendment, finding that
overcrowding was the primary, but not the only, cause of the violations and
that no other relief would remedy the violation. 257 Of course, the state claimed
the “the sky would fall” if the order were effectuated and that public safety
would be imperiled. 258
That claim was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court, which found that
the three judge panel had correctly considered various available methods of
reducing overcrowding—good time credits and diverting low-risk offenders to
community programs—that would have little or no effect on public safety. 259
The state was given two years to comply with the order. 260 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Plata majority, could not have been clearer about the remedy
required to cure the constitutional violation: “This extensive and ongoing
constitutional violation requires a remedy, and a remedy will not be achieved
without a reduction in overcrowding. The relief ordered by the three-judge
court is required by the Constitution . . . . The State shall implement the order
without further delay.” 261
The systemic Rule 1.7, conflict-free counsel, and Sixth Amendment claims
articulated here deserve a remedy closely analogous to the Plata remedy. This
kind of injunctive remedy was first articulated by the Missouri Supreme Court
in Waters where the court approved case refusal as a remedy when public
defenders have so many cases that they cannot represent each of their clients

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 503, 506.
Id. at 506–07.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 509–10.
Plata, 563 U.S. at 502.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 541.
Plata, 563 U.S. at 545.
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competently and effectively. 262 When that occurs, the court noted, trial judges
should prioritize cases on their dockets in the interest of public safety, so that
the most serious cases are assigned to public defenders, and if no competent
public defender can be found to represent those charged with less serious
crimes, those cases should be dismissed, and if the defendants in such cases are
in custody, they should be released. 263
The Plata overcrowding claim was first brought to the attention of the
court in 2001. 264 In 2009, a three-judge court gave the State of California two
years to reduce its prison population from 200% of design capacity to 137.5%
of design capacity. 265 In the interim, the State of California “made significant
progress toward reducing its prison population.” 266 In 2010, the Supreme Court
gave the State of California two years from the date the court issued its
judgment to comply with that order. 267 That timeline is probably a reasonable
expectation for a risk-based claim that asserts a systemic Sixth Amendment
violation.
CONCLUSION
In his new book, “Louis D. Brandeis, American Prophet,” Jeffrey Rosen
traces the evolution of Justice Brandeis’ thought over several decades on the
vexing issue of freedom of thought and belief and dissent in a free society. 268
Rosen recounts a conversation between Justice Brandeis and Justice Felix
Frankfurter in 1921 in which Brandeis told Frankfurter: “I have never been
quite happy about my concurrence in [the] Debs and Schenck cases. I had not
then thought the issues of freedom of speech out—I thought at the subject, not
through it.” 269
A compelling argument can be made, it seems to me, that for the last
quarter century of the twentieth century and the first sixteen years of the
twenty-first century, those of us who have labored in the vineyards of systemic
indigent defense reform—myself included—have thought at the subject of how
to structure the litigation we were bringing, but we have not thought through it.
We have litigated indigent defense cases with little more than a series of
anecdotes, miscellaneous documents, reports about “systemic” deficiencies and
expert testimony that had little more than the wholly unreliable 1973 NAC

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
2016).
269.

State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 612 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
Id. at 611–12.
Plata, 563 U.S. at 507.
Id. at 502, 510, 542.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 542.
See JEFFERY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, AMERICAN PROPHET (Yale Univ. Press
Id. at 126 (alteration in original).
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Standards for a factual predicate and no principled analytical legal standard. If
we are honest with ourselves, we will acknowledge that these claims have been
structured by the judiciary, and not by us.
I argue in this article that we now have three viable jurisprudential
predicates: a risk-based systemic professional ethics claim, a risk-based
systemic conflict-free counsel claim, and a risk-based systemic Sixth
Amendment claim. Moreover, we now have a viable factual predicate—
reliable data and analytics to analyze the workload of a public defender
organization. We can now establish both constitutional and professional ethics
systemic indigent defense claims with principled analytic standards that can be
met with a focused evidentiary showing using reliable data and analytics.
We might look to the death penalty community of lawyers for guidance.
This community of lawyers has produced a remarkable reduction in the
number of death penalties actually meted out since the terrible loss in Gregg v.
Georgia. 270 Indeed, many now believe that the end of this ignominious
institution is in sight and that a turning point in those efforts occurred during
the period 2000 to 2005 with the Supreme Court victories in Rompilla v.
Beard, 271 Wiggins v. Smith, 272 and Williams v. Taylor. 273
All three cases relied on the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and the CJS
Standards for the Defense Function. 274 All three cases imposed heavy financial
burdens on the state to adequately fund mitigation investigation and
litigation. 275 The result was twofold: first, it would cost the state a great deal
more money to litigate death penalty cases; second, once they were adequately
funded with the enormous investigation and litigation resources required for
adequate mitigation in each and every one of these cases, the death penalty
lawyers were successful in a much greater percentage of these cases. It turns
out that if we are adequately funded, we can mitigate almost anyone.
Prosecutors hate to lose cases. Cities and counties hate to spend huge sums of

270. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
271. 545 U.S. 374, 390, 393 (2005) (holding failure to examine file on defendant’s prior
conviction at sentencing phase of capital trial was ineffective assistance of counsel).
272. 539 U.S. 510, 534, 537–38 (2003) (holding inadequate investigation for mitigating
evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
273. 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (holding failure to present mitigating evidence during
sentencing constituted ineffective assistance).
274. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387, n. 7; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522; Williams, 529 U.S. at 396.
275. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 404 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority’s holding
will “saddle States with . . . considerable costs”).
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money on risky death penalty litigation. We are killing a lot fewer people than
we used to. 276
The litigation strategy that I propose here is similar in many respects to
that death penalty litigation strategy. It is based on the remarkable work done
by Norman Lefstein 277 and the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants with the issuance of the Ten Principles of a Public
Defense System in 2002 (specifically Principle 5 regarding excessive
workloads), 278 the issuance of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility’s Formal Opinion that public defenders faced with
excessive workloads must not accept new clients, 279 and issuance of the Eight
Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads in 2009 which
provided a detailed action plan for declining representation in the face of
excessive workloads. 280 The Waters court specifically relied on the Eight
Guidelines in concluding that public defenders have the right (and the duty) to
refuse additional appointments when faced with excessive workloads. 281
By establishing the right and duty to refuse additional cases unless and
until we are adequately funded to provide reasonably effective assistance of
counsel under prevailing professional norms, the cost to the state of its
stubbornly continuing the criminalization of poverty, the criminalization of
homelessness, the criminalization of drug addiction, and the criminalization of
mental illness that has occurred in the last thirty years will be dramatically
increased. And like our death penalty brethren, we will undoubtedly prevail in
many more of our cases once we are adequately funded. And we will start
getting better deals from our prosecutor friends.

276. Only twenty-eight executions took place in 2015, compared to eight-five in the year
2000. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year [http://perma.cc/9HMQ-R5MA].
277. Dean Lefstein can truly be considered the architect of the modern indigent defense
reform movement.
278. ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Ten Principles of a
Public Defense Delivery System (Feb. 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad
ministrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F8H4-6W2A].
279. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion
06-441: Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Who Represent Indigent Defendants when Excessive
Caseloads Interfere with Diligent and Competent Representation (May 13, 2006), http://www.a
mericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_
train_aba_ethics_on_excessive_caseloads.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/LF7W-2LS6].
280. ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Eight Guidelines of
Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads (Aug. 2009), https://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_
public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/RV64-NC39].
281. See State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
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Constructive denial of counsel claims, even if successful, turn these
principles on their heads. We, not the state, must spend huge sums of money
and enormous amounts of time to establish our claim. Risk-based claims for
systemic Sixth Amendment violations, on the other hand, when successful,
require the state to lower caseloads, 282 which means states must either spend
huge sums of money (supply-side solution with many more lawyers and
investigators) or significantly shrink the system (demand-side solution
decriminalizing the lower-risk cases in the system).
My critique of the constructive denial of counsel claim in this article
should in no way be read as a criticism of the lawyers, experts, and others who
have engaged in the overwhelmingly arduous and costly work required to
achieve reform under that standard. Those efforts were extraordinary,
laudatory, and conducted in the highest and best traditions of our profession.
And in fairness to them, as I show above, they first brought a risk-based claim
for systemic Sixth Amendment violations to the courts, only to have the courts
misconstrue that claim as a performance-based claim and then restate that
claim as a systemic claim for constructive denial. 283 I simply argue here that
there is a better, more focused, more principled, and more powerful way
forward, employing a principled analytical standard that can be met with a
focused evidentiary showing using reliable data and analytics.
One final caveat. Conceivably, some courts may be tempted to view the
risk-based Sixth Amendment claim that I have articulated here as the same
kind of performance-based claim appropriately rejected by the Luckey court for
a systemic pre-trial Sixth Amendment challenge to an indigent defense system.
This is because I posit here that the appropriate test in such a challenge is a
significant risk of prejudice due to a systemic inability to perform, and courts
are accustomed to treating the prejudice standard as an essential part of a
performance-based individual post-conviction claim. However, I have faith
that the courts will understand that proving prejudice after conviction is
fundamentally different from proving a significant risk of prejudice to a
defendant pretrial. In short, I believe that the courts, and hopefully the rest of
us, will no longer merely think at this subject, but will now begin thinking
through it.

282. Id. at 612.
283. See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010).

